Amir Taheri

According to the Bush administration’s latest plan for Iraq, an Iraqi provisional government should be in place in Baghdad by next June. The decision reverses an earlier one made by Washington to keep Paul Bremer in charge until after a new Iraqi constitution is in place.

The new plan for Iraq has angered some hawks in Washington who believe that the Iraqis are not yet ready for the proposed handover of power. For their part, some Europeans do not like the new plan because it eliminates chances of putting Iraq under a UN mandate.

In a column published in this page last March, less than three weeks before the war started, we argued against direct US rule and urged the administration to quickly set up an Iraqi provisional government. We suggested that if the administration studied Iraq’s history, it would “realize that the British, who created the modern Iraqi state, did not try to rule it directly but depended on the local elites for the purpose.”

Needless to say, Washington decided to go for interim direct rule, first under Gen. Jay Garner and later under Bremer.

This, however, should not be taken as a criticism of the administration’s Iraq policy so far. History is never written in advance, and anyone who believes in a seamless application of clever scenarios in a complex situation, such as the one in post-liberation Iraq, is naive. The coalition’s Iraq policy is certain to remain messy, marred by blunders and an easy target for those nostalgic about Saddam’s regime.

All that, however, would matter little once a basic fact is understood: There are two Iraq problems.

The first concerns the situation inside Iraq. The second is the way Iraq as an issue of domestic politics in Western democracies, especially the US and Britain which are directly involved.

There are no tidal waves of refugees and displaced persons, no revenge killings, no land-grab by opportunist gangs, no outbreak of epidemics, and, more importantly, no popular opposition to the US-led occupation.

At the same time much of the nation’s infrastructure is back to normal while the economy, including oil production, is slowly moving ahead. The coalition, however, is not at the end of its troubles in Iraq.

The transfer of power will not end the terrorist challenge. This will continue for as long as Iraq lacks a proper security apparatus and a credible counter-terrorism force.

Right now the terrorists can strike where and when they like because the coalition army that faces them is trained and equipped for modern warfare, not fighting urban terror. The coalition also faces problems on the political front.

Its decision to postpone the writing of a new constitution and the holding of elections in any form is a mistake.

It may now be too late for the coalition to change plans again. But it could still limit the possible damage by doing two things: First it should demand that all participants in the provisional government sign a document setting out the principles of governance in Iraq.

These should include respect for human rights, legal equality for citizens regardless of gender, religion and ethnic background, a pluralist political system with free and fair elections, and a foreign policy based on peace and cooperation. The document could be presented as a “national charter” which, in turn, provides the basis for a new constitution.

Secondly, the “national charter” should be submitted to the people in a referendum. Holding a referendum does not pose the problems that organizing parliamentary elections would in a country with no reliable electoral rolls.

All Iraqis aged 16 or above should be asked to say yes or no to the proposed “national charter.”

A referendum will bestow on the provisional government a measure of popular legitimacy which it would otherwise lack.

It would bring the Iraqi people into the picture by highlighting the principle of national sovereignty.

The most effective weapon the coalition has against the terrorist movement and its sympathizers in Arab and European countries is the Iraqi people. The decision not to consult the Iraqi people for at least another 18 months is a mistake.