Palestinian Premier Ahmed Qorei may have lost his power struggle with Yasser Arafat for the control of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, but some will argue that in his defeat, he has won his first victory. Had the new prime minister thrown up his hands in despair and followed the example of his predecessor Mahmoud Abbas and resigned, he would have increased instability within the Palestinian leadership.

Staying on, in one of the toughest political jobs around, proves that Qorei is either a man with a blind lust for power, which even his political enemies would never claim, or a politician of sober and dogged principle. This is not to condemn Mahmoud Abbas. He was given specific assurances about his independence of action when he agreed to take the premiership. When those promises were not delivered, his resignation was inevitable. His successor, by contrast, knew just how difficult his job was going to be.

There were long and difficulty arguments with Yasser Arafat over the control of the security portfolio. In the end Qorei chose to yield. The ratification of the new Cabinet by the Palestinian Parliament is being followed by low-level talks between Palestinian and Israeli officials, preparing a scheduled meeting of Qorei and Sharon in nine days’ time.

Yet in one sense Qorei may be quietly pleased that he has failed to wrest control of the security apparatus from the president, despite the excuse this gives to Bush and Sharon to continue their refusal to deal with a Palestinian state of which Yasser Arafat is the elected leader. It could be argued that now is not the time to take on the fundamentalists. The angry despair that the Israelis have stoked among even moderate Palestinians would make any curbs on Hamas or Islamic Jihad deeply unpopular. Because he does not have the power to initiate a clampdown, Qorei avoids blame for further acts of violence by the hard-liners. That responsibility remains with the Palestinian president. Short of killing or seizing Arafat and taking him from Palestine, as they at one point planned, the Israelis and the Americans are stuck with their political bogeyman.

Washington can continue to refuse to deal with him, but as its ill thought-out Iraqi policy is caught up in violent resistance, it may dawn on the Bush White House that a just Palestinian settlement, enforced on Israel by the Americans, could have a direct impact on their fortunes in Iraq. At that point, Premier Qorei would represent the political figure with whom Washington could hammer out a genuine settlement. The right deal would mean that maybe only a few die hard-extremists would need to be tackled by the Palestinian security forces, and the civil strife likely to follow a clampdown would be avoided. In that admittedly rosy scenario, Qorei won’t have needed control of security.

Victory in Defeat?

Palestinian Premier Ahmed Qorei may have lost his power struggle with Yasser Arafat for the control of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, but some will argue that in his defeat, he has won his first victory. Had the new prime minister thrown up his hands in despair and followed the example of his predecessor Mahmoud Abbas and resigned, he would have increased instability within the Palestinian leadership.

Staying on, in one of the toughest political jobs around, proves that Qorei is either a man with a blind lust for power, which even his political enemies would never claim, or a politician of sober and dogged principle. This is not to condemn Mahmoud Abbas. He was given specific assurances about his independence of action when he agreed to take the premiership. When those promises were not delivered, his resignation was inevitable. His successor, by contrast, knew just how difficult his job was going to be.

There were long and difficulty arguments with Yasser Arafat over the control of the security portfolio. In the end Qorei chose to yield. The ratification of the new Cabinet by the Palestinian Parliament is being followed by low-level talks between Palestinian and Israeli officials, preparing a scheduled meeting of Qorei and Sharon in nine days’ time.

Yet in one sense Qorei may be quietly pleased that he has failed to wrest control of the security apparatus from the president, despite the excuse this gives to Bush and Sharon to continue their refusal to deal with a Palestinian state of which Yasser Arafat is the elected leader. It could be argued that now is not the time to take on the fundamentalists. The angry despair that the Israelis have stoked among even moderate Palestinians would make any curbs on Hamas or Islamic Jihad deeply unpopular. Because he does not have the power to initiate a clampdown, Qorei avoids blame for further acts of violence by the hard-liners. That responsibility remains with the Palestinian president. Short of killing or seizing Arafat and taking him from Palestine, as they at one point planned, the Israelis and the Americans are stuck with their political bogeyman.

Washington can continue to refuse to deal with him, but as its ill thought-out Iraqi policy is caught up in violent resistance, it may dawn on the Bush White House that a just Palestinian settlement, enforced on Israel by the Americans, could have a direct impact on their fortunes in Iraq. At that point, Premier Qorei would represent the political figure with whom Washington could hammer out a genuine settlement. The right deal would mean that maybe only a few die hard-extremists would need to be tackled by the Palestinian security forces, and the civil strife likely to follow a clampdown would be avoided. In that admittedly rosy scenario, Qorei won’t have needed control of security.