Everyone should welcome the return of good relations between Pakistan and India, but no one should kid themselves: The problems facing these two nuclear powers, principally the status of largely Indian-controlled Kashmir, have not gone away.

That said, careful consideration should be given to why the two countries did not come to blows for their fourth conflict in 56 years. There have been three different influences at work. The first and most superficial has been the United States. Washington simply did not want anything to divert the world’s attention from its war on international terrorism. In the simplistic American analysis, the Kashmiri militants certainly fitted the profile of international terrorism, especially after their attack on the Indian Parliament. But then Pakistan, the unofficial source of funds and bases for the insurgents, was playing a key role in Washington’s campaign against the Taleban and Al-Qaeda.

The Islamabad government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf was in enough trouble with its citizens on its Northwest frontier. The widespread opposition to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, and the fury at Musharraf’s support for the attack, would probably have become an unstoppable tidal wave of protest had Islamabad also been forced by the US into a humiliating accommodation with India. Thus, while preserving its official denial of involvement in the campaign of Kashmiri militants, the most that Islamabad had to do was close down some front organizations used by terrorists and arrest a few leaders. India allowed itself to be persuaded by Washington that this must suffice.

In a way, however, both New Delhi and Islamabad must have been grateful for a way out of their latest confrontation, because of the second key influence at work: they are now both nuclear powers. From a tactical point of view, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may have redressed a numerical imbalance with the Indian armed forces; but from a practical perspective the existence of a mutual nuclear option has actually made a full-blown conflict between the two countries, less not more likely.

And, finally, there is the third influence. It was India who threatened to attack Pakistan. Even without the presence of nuclear armaments on both sides, what would the Indians have gained — assuming (and it is a big assumption) — they had been able to defeat the Pakistan Army and advance into the country, except the the hard-to-disguise humiliation of a withdrawal to their borders, forced on them by an outraged international community?

India’s problem is that it is already the occupier of Kashmir. It has to defend that occupation against the insurgents within and against the external arguments that Kashmir’s status should be decided by international arbitration. A war against Pakistan, however successful militarily, would not have helped. Indeed, it would probably have made matters worse, because Kashmir would have been brought into the postwar settlement.

Thus at three separate levels, a fourth war between India and Pakistan is one that neither side, but the Indians in particular, dares to fight. All this in itself will not solve the vexed question of the future of Kashmir. However, it may in time persuade New Delhi that the only lasting solution lies in negotiations overseen by the international community.