Amir Taheri  --  Arab news

PARIS, 10 March 2004 — Although no date has been set for polling day, Iraqi politics has already shifted into election campaign gear.

The most dramatic illustration of this so far came last Friday when five Shiite members of the Iraq Governing Council, the nation’s interim authority, failed to show up at a ceremony organized to sign a constitutional draft. The interim constitution has now been signed but too many questions still remain.

The boycott was not announced until the last minute and thus achieved maximum impact. Television audiences throughout the country saw other members of the council milling around, consulting their watches, and, in some cases, biting their nails, while a group of 24 schoolgirls, dressed in folk costumes, waited anxiously to perform a special number written for what was to be an historic occasion but wasn’t.

Some in the Western media have seen the Baghdad boycott episode as “a major setback for US plans in Iraq” and “a rupture between the Shiites and the US.” That analysis, however, misses the point.

The boycott was not designed to torpedo the agreed draft constitution or to upset plans for the transfer of power to the Iraqis. Nor was the aim to make life more difficult for Paul Bremer, the American “Pasha” who heads the interim coalition authority.

The five who stayed away are known as the most experienced politicians among the 13 Shiites who make up a majority of the Governing Council. Iraq observers agree that almost all the “boycott five” will secure seats in the transitional government to be set up on June 30 when the period of occupation officially comes to a close.

Among the five there is Iraqi National Council (INC) leader Ahmad Chalabi, who have had close ties to the United States for decades. There is also Abdel-Aziz Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), who has done more than many to foster trust between the coalition and the Iraqi Shiites. Another member of the “boycott” quintet, Muhammad Bahr Al-Olum, has played a key role in the dialogue between the Shiite clergy and the coalition authorities. The other two members of the quintet, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, leader of the Al-Daawah (The Call) Party and Muwaffaq Al-Rubaie, an independent politician, have emerged as moderate figures with genuine democratic aspirations.

One other point needs to be recalled: of the 13 Shiite members of the Governing Council, only the five mentioned above decided to stay away. In other words there was no collective Shiite action to postpone the signing of the draft constitution, let alone derail the entire scheme. The boycott decision was taken late last Thursday after a grand meeting of Shiite religious, tribal, business and political leaders at the home of Grand Ayatollah Ali Muhammad Sistani, the primus inter pares of Iraqi clerics, in Najaf.

Two members of the Governing Council briefed Sistani and other clerics present about the constitutional draft and invited them to support the document. At the Najaf meeting, Sistani and the other clerics raised two objections to the proposed draft.

One concerns a mechanism under which the interim constitution could be suspended if two-thirds of voters in just three of the 18 provinces so decide.

The measure was inserted as an additional assurance for the minorities, notably Kurds and Turcoman who fear that the new Iraq, dominated by the Shiite majority, might threaten their legitimate aspiration to autonomy and cultural self-realization. Because some provinces are sparsely populated, such a mechanism could give a few hundred thousand voters a veto power.

The second Shiite objection concerns the composition of the presidential council that will supervise the period of transition. Under the agreed arrangement, the Shiites will not receive a two-third share of the seats which they believe reflects their demographic position in the country as a whole. The Shiite objections concern technical points that could be ironed out through negotiations.

What is significant is that the Shiite community has been almost unanimous in endorsing the constitutional draft. The Shiites have learned the lesson of 1918-1919 when they refused to cooperate with the British occupation authorities in setting up Iraq as an independent nation-state. As a result the Shiites shut themselves out of Iraq politics for decades, ending up living in a country ruled by the Sunni minority.

During the past few months the politics of liberated Iraq has developed its own careful choreography.

This is how things proceed: the “Pasha” puts his ideas in circulation. They are immediately attacked by everyone, most notably by the Shiites. Then all sides enter into negotiations that include a great deal of posturing. Eventually a compromise emerges. This is almost invariably rejected by Sistani whose tactic has been to play the democratic card and to call for people power. Then follows another series of negotiations which lead to new compromise.

This is then endorsed by Sistani, often with a wink and a nod. The tactic is to push the coalition and the Governing Council to the edge, but not beyond. The “boycott quintet” is using a similar tactic.

They know that they need to do three things at the same time

• Keep the political process on course,

• Keep their popular base motivated and mobilized,

• Counter claims that they are mere puppets in an American game.

In other words they are acting as any normal politician would do wherever decisions are not taken and imposed by a despot or a dictatorial ruling clique. In other words the Iraqis are learning democracy on the job.

Writing a democratic constitution is never easy and always takes time. Most recently the Afghans spent almost 18 months on the task. The Iraqis have written theirs in just 10 weeks.

In the weeks and months ahead, Iraq is going to have a lot of politics with a great many cliff-hangers.

Don’t be surprised if Chalabi emerges as the leader of a movement to end “American occupation.”

Iraqi politicians on all sides are beginning to learn how to use the full bag of tricks that comes with normal politics. The Shiites wish to highlight their numerical strength without scaring away other communities.

The Kurds emphasize their 12-year experience in democratic self-rule and their privileged relations with Washington. Sunnis, for their part, wish to make most of their administrative experience and the contribution they could make to the nation’s new armed forces, diplomatic service and cultural life.

All in all, Iraqis seem to be developing a taste for politics, something they had been deprived of for almost half a century. And that, believe me, is a privilege that few other nations in the region enjoy today.