Mohammad Daraghmeh, Special to Arab News

OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, 20 February 2004 — To many Palestinians and Israelis, the Geneva document, signed by unofficial Israeli and Palestinian political figures, seems a flicker of light in the dark that has engulfed the region for over three years. For the first time since the eruption of the intifada in September 2000, a potential solution with a large content of realism has appeared on the horizon. The realism of this document stems from its feasibility, as it was based on the conclusions achieved by the two parties in previous negotiations. The negotiators themselves, who participated in earlier Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, picked up from the points where previous rounds left off.

“Our delegation carried with it maps and documents it acquired during the last official negotiations in Camp David and Taba with the Ehud Barak government, and commenced from that point to arrive at the document we have today,” says Kadura Faris, one of the leaders of the young generation within the Fatah movement, and one of the prominent members of the Palestinian delegation to the Geneva negotiations. Kadura describes the Geneva document as “the best result reached by the Palestinian party in its negotiations with Israel since the Madrid conference in 1991,” referring to the Israeli team’s acknowledgement of the Palestinians’ right to an independent state on all the lands occupied in 1967 with minor border modifications.

The Geneva document stipulates that settlements shall be combined in groups occupying 2.6 percent of the West Bank area, and Palestinians in return are compensated with lands in the Gaza and Hebron areas. Palestinian-Israeli negotiations documents show that the most that Labor governments ever gave to Palestinians in previous negotiations did not exceed 91 percent of the West Bank lands. It must be pointed out here that various national and Islamic Palestinian factions are in consensus that the independent Palestinian state represents the main objective of the Palestinian people.

The document also sends a very important message to the Israeli street, where the voices of the right wing and extremism rise above all others. “The Palestinian position in the Geneva document presents a response to the Israeli and American claims that there is no Palestinian partner for peace,” says Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi, one of the most prominent Palestinian researchers and analysts. “The Palestinians proved to the Israeli street that they are partners, and it is now up to the peace camp in Israel to fight the election battle, take the leadership and grab the opportunity to achieve peace for both nations, based on this document,” adds Shiqaqi.

The Geneva document carries an equilibrium that makes it potentially acceptable to both sides, although some, or perhaps many, accept it rather reluctantly. In this document, the Palestinian party achieves its objectives of a Palestinian state on lands occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital, and a solution to the refugee problem that provides for the right of return in principle. The document also offers a solution to water problems based on sharing rights to common aquifers, and a solution to the prisoners problem whereby 90 percent of the prisoners are released in the first year and the rest over a thirty-month period. The document also proposes a safe passageway between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The document provides Israel with a solution to the settlements issue by combining settlements in clusters, a solution in Jerusalem that gives it control of the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Quarter, and freedom from the “ghost” of millions of Palestinian refugees that the Jewish state views as a source of danger threatening its existence.

Many observers in Israel view this document as a basis for reaching an acceptable settlement. “The current situation does not provide for the success of the document, but when they get better, i.e. when the fighting stops, the Israeli public opinion may resort to it as an acceptable framework for a solution, or as a bridge that takes us to one”, says a former Israeli diplomat, Victor Nahmias. He adds: “The Geneva document represents an initiative of hope, but the climate of war has obscured it.”

The document affected the right-wing government in two ways. The first is that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his deputy Ehud Olmert resorted to talking about a settlement based on unilateral measures. The second is that the government resorted to a military escalation that has displaced the document as the main topic of dialogue among the Israeli public. But observers in Israel see the document as something that will lead to a middle course, once Sharon realizes the limitations of military power. Nahmias adds: “The continuing bloody clashes obscured the significance of the document. Under conditions of killing, assassination and violence, hope and optimism recede, and priority is given to talk about violence and putting an end to it. But when the parties realize the limits of their powers, priorities will change and the document will assume its role in seeking a solution and a settlement to the conflict.” This, he says, will happen sooner or later. Israel will realize the limitations of its power. Its superior army will not vanquish the Palestinians, who will also realize that force will not compel Israel to change its positions.

As much as it brings “pleasant” surprises for the two parties, the Geneva document also involves painful concessions essential for any settlement. On the Palestinian side, many activists within the refugee-rights circle express objections to the document. Tayseer Nasrallah, head of the Committee for Defending Refugee Rights, with headquarters in the city of Nablus, says: “The way we understand its text, the document clearly abandons the right of return of five million refugees. This is unacceptable to those refugees and to all the Palestinian people”.

But Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi does not feel that the document abandons the principle of the right of return, although it makes concessions as far as return mechanisms are concerned. “In principle, the document considers UN resolution 194 and the Arab Initiative launched at the Beirut summit conference as a basis for the solution.

This does not imply abandoning the right of return, but rather that return mechanisms give Israel the right to decide the number of returning refugees, which represents a concession.” Shiqaqi referred to the results of a survey conducted by the Palestinian Policy Research Center he runs, which indicated that only a limited number of refugees wish to return to Israel.

The Palestinian side to the Geneva document cites pragmatic reasons to justify the concessions made regarding the right of return. “Let us be realistic. There is only one method of returning five million Palestinian refugees to Israel. That is by using force. But is that realistic?” asks Kadura Faris, the parliamentarian and minister who commands much respect among the Palestinian public.

The balanced nature of the Geneva document makes it a basis for any potential solution in future.

As Dr. Shiqaqi says: “If there is ever an opportunity for a political settlement, it will always be within the framework of the Geneva document.”

— Mohammad Daraghmeh is a Palestinian journalist and writer.